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Abstract—This paper explores an idea of demand-supply
balance for smart grids in which consumers are expected to play
a significant role. The main objective is to motivate the consumer,
by maximizing their benefit both as a seller and a buyer, to trade
their surplus energy with the grid so as to balance the demand
at the peak hour. To that end, a Stackelberg game is proposed
to capture the interactions between the grid and consumers, and
it is shown analytically that optimal energy trading parameters
that maximize customers’ utilities are obtained at the solution
of the game. A novel distributed algorithm is proposed to reach
the optimal solution of the game, and numerical examples are
used to assess the properties and effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
Index Terms—Smart grid, two-way communication, demand
management, Stackelberg game, consumer’s benefit, variational
equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid (SG) is envisioned to be a large-scale
next generation cyber-physical system that will improve the
efficiency, reliability, and robustness of future power and
energy grids by integrating the consumers as one of its key
management components [1], and thus, achieve a system
which is clean, safe, reliable, resilient and sustainable. This
heterogeneous network will motivate the adoption of advanced
technologies that will increase the participation of its con-
sumers to overcome various technical challenges at different
levels of demand-supply balance [1].
In this respect, game theory, which is an analytical frame-
work to capture the complex interactions among rational
players [2] is studied in this paper to model an energy trading
scheme for the SG. The model uses the two-way communi-
cation facility of the SG [3], and inspires the customers to
spontaneously take part in supplying their surplus energy (SE)
to the grid so as to assist the power grid (PG) in balancing
the excess energy demand at the peak hour. This voluntary
participation of consumers in energy trading is very important
in the context of SG because of its ability to greatly enhance
the SG’s reliability, and thus, improve the social benefit of the
This work is supported by NICTA. NICTA is funded by the Australian
Government as represented by the Department of Broadband, Communications
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electricity market [4]. We use the framework of a Stackelberg
game [2] for this model in which the PG is considered as the
leader and energy users (EUs) are the followers. Here, on the
one hand, the PG decides on the total amount of energy it
wants to buy, and also on the price per unit of energy it needs
to pay to each EU. On the other hand, the EU decides on its
amount of energy to be sold to the PG in response to the price
offered to it.
We note that energy management in the context of SG
has been receiving considerable attention recently. For exam-
ple, energy management for SGs in a vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
scenario have been studied in [1, 3, 5] and the references
therein, whereby the application of game theory for demand-
supply balance in SGs can be found in [3] and [5]. However,
little has been done in prioritizing the consumers’ benefit in
management modeling where the main priority of the energy
management scheme is to benefit the consumers. We stress
that consumers are the core element of the evolution of SG as
explained in [6], and hence, their benefit is one of the most
important concerns of any demand-supply modeling scheme.
In this respect, we propose an energy management scheme
that prioritizes the consumers in the SG and balances demand
with supply at peak hours. We first formulate a noncooperative
Stackelberg game (NSG) to study the interactions between
the PG and EUs in the SG, and show that the optimal
demand-supply balance can be achieved at the solution of
the game; then we analyze properties of the game in terms
of existence and optimality, and it is shown that the game
possesses a socially optimal solution; finally, we propose a
distributed algorithm to reach the solution of the game, and
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme is demonstrated via
numerical experiments.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an SG network that consists of a single PG and a
number of EUs. The set of EUs is N , where |N | = N . Here,
the PG refers to the main electricity grid which is servicing
a group of customers at peak hours of the day (i.e., 12 pm
to 4 pm), and each EU i ∈ N is a group of similar idle
energy users [1], connected via an aggregator [7], such as
smart homes, electric vehicles, wind mills, solar panels and
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bio-gas plants that have some SE for sale after regular usage. It
is assumed that the PG can communicate with the EUs through
smart meters via an appropriate communication protocol [3].
Due to frequent change of energy state in the grid, energy
management in the SG needs to be carried out frequently [5],
and therefore, the total peak hour duration can be divided into
multiple time slots [5]. As energy demands by the customers
are very high during the peak hours, the PG may be unable
to balance some of the demands from its own generation in
some of these time slots. Meanwhile, the PG needs to buy
energy from alternative energy sources such as idle EUs who
have SE, and may agree to sell it to the PG with appropriate
incentives. For the rest of the paper, we will concentrate on
the energy management in a single time slot. It is assumed
that the energy deficiency of the PG, EPG, at any time slot is
fixed although the deficiency may vary from one time slot to
the next. However, as the required energy by the PG is fixed
during a time slot, the PG would not be interested in buying
more energy than EPG to keep its cost at a minimum. Thus, if
each EU i with SE Ei provides the PG with energy xi, these
quantities need to satisfy
∑
i
xi ≤ EPG; xi ≤ Ei, ∀i. (1)
To buy an offered amount of energy xi, the PG pays a price
pi per unit of energy to EU i as an incentive. However, the PG
may need to pay different incentives to different EUs due to
their different amounts of SE. For instance, a lower incentive
may not affect the intended revenue of an EU with higher SE
as it can sell more, but could severely affect the revenue of EUs
with smaller amounts of SE. Moreover, the PG may also want
to minimize its total cost of purchase as it would further enable
the PG to sell this energy at a cheaper rate to its customer. This
would facilitate the trading of energy between the PG and the
EUs in the network rather than establishing more expensive
generators or bulk capacitors to meet any excess demand, and
also, the cheaper rate would benefit the consumers who buy
the energy from the PG. To this end, we assume that the PG
estimates a total price Pr per unit of energy, analogous to the
total cost per unit production in economics [8], in each time
slot using a real time price estimation technique as proposed
in [9]. The PG uses this Pr to optimize the price pi it will
pay to each EU i to order to minimize its total cost while
maintaining the constraint
∑
i
pi = Pr; p
min ≤ pi ≤ p
max. (2)
The equality constraint in (2) establishes that the announced
total price per unit energy must be paid to all EUs, and thus
motivates the EUs to take part in energy trading with the PG.
Here, pmin is the minimum price that the PG needs to pay EU
i to incentivize it to trade energy, and pmax is the maximum
price that the PG can pay. Although Pr is fixed, pi can be
different for different i based on xi.
III. STACKELBERG GAME AND ITS PROPERTIES
In a consumer-prioritized SG, the beneficiaries of the energy
management scheme are the consumers in the network [6]. In
this regard, we propose an NSG, in which on the one hand,
the objective of each EU i is to voluntarily sell an amount
of energy xi to the PG based on Ei and the offered price pi
so as to maximize its own utility. On the other hand, the PG
wants to minimize its total cost of purchase by optimizing pi
for different i as explained in Section II. To this end, we now
define the objective functions of the leader and followers of
the game.
A. Objective functions of the EUs and the PG
The considered utility function of EU i, U(xi, Ei, pi), is
based on a linearly decreasing marginal benefit, which is
appropriate for energy users [10]. In addition, the utility
function is also assumed to possess the following properties:
i) the utility of EU i increases with the amount of SE Ei, i.e.,
δU
δEi
> 0; and ii) the utility of an EU increases as pi increases,
i.e., δU
δpi
> 0. To meet the above properties, in this work we
consider the following utility function for EU i:
U(xi, Ei, pi) = Eixi −
1
2
xi
2 + pixi. (3)
From (3), we note that the addition of the quantity∑
j 6=i Ejxj −
1
2xj
2 + pjxj to U in (3) does not affect the
solution. Consequently, all the EUs equivalently maximize
Uˆ(x,E,p) =
N∑
i=1
U(xi, Ei, pi), (4)
subject to the constraint ∑i xi ≤ EPG, ∀i. Here, x =
[x1, x2, . . . , xN ]
T
, E = [E1, E2, . . . , EN ]
T and p =
[p1, p2, . . . , pN ]
T
.
On the other hand, the PG’s target is to decide on its price
pi based on the offered energy xi by EU i so as to minimize
the total cost of purchase J˜(p) =
∑
i J(pi). Here, J(pi) is
the individual cost including the cost of purchasing with price
pi and other associated costs. For J(pi), we consider a convex
cost function
J(pi) = xipi
2 + aipi + bi; ai, bi > 0; ∀i ∈ N , (5)
which is comparable to the practical cost function of some
utility companies [3]. In (5), the first term captures the cost of
purchasing energy, whereas the associated costs1 are reflected
in the last two terms. In (5), J possesses the following
properties: i) J increases with the increase of pi. That is
J(pˆi) < J(p´i), ∀pˆi < p´i; and ii) J is strictly convex.
Thus, for pˆi, p´i ≥ 0, ∀i and any real number 0 < γ < 1,
J(γpˆi + (1 − γ)p´i) < γJ(pˆi) + (1 − γ)J(p´i). The objective
of the PG is to minimize its total cost, and thus, the net cost
1Examples include transmission and artificial tariff costs.
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function of the PG is
J˜(p) =
N∑
i=1
(
xipi
2 + aipi + bi
)
; (6)
s.t.,
∑
i
pi = Pr; p
min ≤ pi ≤ p
max ∀i.
As EUs are owned by individual consumers, the PG cannot
directly control their decision making processes, and hence, a
decentralized control mechanism is required for both EUs and
the PG to decide on xi and pi by optimizing their respective
utility and cost functions in (4) and (6).
B. Formulation of the game
The PG and EUs interact with each other to decide on their
energy trading parameters pi and xi, and we propose an NSG2
Λ to capture this interaction. In this game, the PG is the leader
who decides on the price pi for the amount of energy offered
by the EU i, and each EU i is a follower who agrees on xi to
be offered to the PG in response to pi by playing a generalized
Nash game (GNG) [12] with other followers in the SG. Hence,
the proposed NSG can be defined by its strategic form as
Λ = {(N ∪ {PG}), {Xi}i∈N , Uˆ , J˜ ,p}, (7)
where (N ∪ {PG}) is the set of all players in the game, and
{Xi}i∈N is the vector of strategies of EU i satisfying (1).
In this game, an EU’s decision is affected by the strategies of
other EUs through (1), and thus, the GNG amongst EUs, to de-
cide on xi ∀i, is a jointly convex generalized Nash equilibrium
problem (GNEP) [12], whose solution is a generalized Nash
equilibrium (GNE). The proposed game is played in two steps.
In the first step, the game is initiated with the announcement
of the price pi = p, ∀i satisfying (2) by the PG, upon which
the EUs play a GNEP to decide on the GNE energy set x they
wish to sell to the PG. The PG receives the offered energy x
and thereby obtains some insight into the capacity3 of each
EU i. In the second step, the PG optimizes its price vector to
p∗ = [p1
∗, . . . , pN
∗]T , by a constraint optimization technique
for the offered x. Thereafter, the EUs again decide on their
GNE energy vector x∗ = [x1∗, . . . , xN ∗]T in response to p∗
and the proposed NSG reaches its noncooperative Stackelberg
equilibrium (NSE).
Definition 1: Consider the NSG Λ in (7), in which Uˆ and
J˜ are defined by (4) and (6) respectively. A set of strategies
(x∗,p∗) constitutes the NSE of the game if and only if the
strategy set satisfies the following set of inequalities:
Uˆ(xi
∗,x−i
∗,E,p∗) ≥ Uˆ(xi,x−i
∗,E,p∗), (8)
∀xi ∈ x, ∀i ∈ N ,
∑
i
xi ≤ EPG,
and
J˜(pi
∗,p∗−i) ≤ J˜(pi,p
∗
−i), (9)
∀i ∈ N , ∀pi ∈ p, p
min ≤ pi ≤ p
max.
2A similar form of game for charging of electric vehicles in smart grid was
used in [11].
3For a similar price p, each EU receives a similar incentive, and thus their
offered energies reflect their capacities of supply.
Here, x−i is the energy vector of all EUs in the set N except
EU i, and similarly, p−i is the price vector set by the PG for
all EUs in N excluding i.
Therefore, at the NSE, neither any EU nor the PG can
increase its utility by deviating from its NSE strategy while
all other players in the SG are playing their NSE strategies.
C. Existence and optimality
In this section, we investigate the existence of a socially
optimal solution which is beneficial for all the consumers
in the SG, and thus, suitable for the proposed consumer-
prioritized energy management scheme. In this regard, first
we note that the proposed NSG reaches the NSE as soon as
all EUs agree on a GNE energy vector x∗ in response to the
optimized price vector p∗ set by the PG. Due to the strict
convexity of (6), there always exists a unique solution [13]
for the price vector p∗, and thus, the existence of a socially
optimal GNE of the followers’ GNEP would guarantee the
existence of a socially optimal NSE of the proposed NSG.
Theorem 1: There exists a socially optimal GNE solution
for the GNEP amongst the EUs in response to the price set
by the PG.
Proof: First, we note that the proposed GNEP is a jointly
convex GNEP due to the coupled constraint (1), and hence,
the GNEP can be formulated as a variational inequality (VI)
problem VI(X,F) [12], which can be used to determine a
vector x∗ ∈ X ∈ Rn such that 〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X.
Here, X is the vector of strategies of all EUs satisfying (1)
and, from [12]
F = − (∇xU(xi, Ei, pi))
N
i=1 . (10)
The solution of a VI is a variational equilibrium (VE), which
is the socially optimal solution among other GNEs [12]. To
this end, our main concern it to study the existence of the VE
of the GNEP, and thus, check the optimality of the solution.
Hereinafter, we will use GNEP and VI interchangeably, and
VE to refer to both the VE and GNE of the GNEP. Now, the
pseudo-gradient of the joint utility function Uˆ in (4) is [12]
F =


x1 − E1 − p1
x2 − E2 − p2
.
.
.
xN − EN − pN

 , (11)
and the Jacobean of (11), JF, is an identity matrix. Hence,
JF is positive definite on X, and consequently, F is strictly
monotone. Therefore, VI(X,F) admits a unique VE [14].
Moreover, due to the joint convexity of the proposed GNEP,
the unique VE is also the global unique maximizer of (4) [14],
and thus, the existence of a socially optimal VE of the
proposed GNEP is proved.
From Theorem 1, we can further conclude that the proposed
NSG possesses a socially optimal NSE.
D. Algorithm
In this section, we propose a distributed algorithm for
the considered NSG to reach the socially optimal NSE. The
algorithm is implemented based on the fact that F is strongly
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monotone, and thus, the slack variables µi = Ei−xi+pi, ∀i ∈
N all possess the same value µi = µ at the VE [14]. We
assume that there is limited communication between the PG
and EUs via the two-way communications of the SG, and
thus, the PG can inform4 the EU i if its offered energy xi
is beyond the VE in response to p∗i (by checking whether
µi = µ, ∀i). We use a hyperplane projection method for the
VI, which is the simplest solution method for a monotone
VI [12], and its solution is always guaranteed to converge to
a non-empty VE [12]. Since the PG’s optimization problem
is strictly convex and has a unique solution, consequently, the
proposed algorithm also guarantees that the NSG will reach
its socially optimal NSE.
The algorithm is executed in two steps as shown in Algo-
rithm 1. As a hyperplane projection method, we use the S-S
method [12, 15], which is based on a geometrical interpretation
and uses two projections per iteration. Let xl be the current
approximation of the solution of VI(X,F). In the S-S method,
first the projection r(xl) = PrjX
(
xl − F (xl)
)
is computed5,
and then a point zl is determined in the line segment between
xl and r(xl), using an Armijo-type search [12]. Then, xl is
separated from the other solution x∗ of the problem via the
hyperplane δM l = {x ∈ Rn|〈F (zl), x − zl〉 = 0}. Now, as
soon as the hyperplane is constructed, xl+1 is computed in the
next iteration onto the feasible set of X with the hyperspace
δM l = {x ∈ Rn|〈F (zl), x − zl〉 ≤ 0} which contains the
solution set [15]. The details of the S-S method can be found
in [15].
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We simulate the proposed energy management scheme
by considering a number of different EUs, where each EU
represents 20 similar energy consumers connected via an
aggregator. The available SE of each EU is assumed to be a
uniformly distributed random variable in the range of [64, 240]
kilowatt hour (kWh), and thus covers both the lowest battery
capacity of a group of solar panels (3.6 kWh per panel) and the
highest battery capacity of a wind turbine group (12.25 kWh
per turbine). The total price per unit energy is assumed to be
175 US cents6, and (pmin, pmax) = (8.45, 175) cents, unless
stated otherwise. All the statistical results are averaged over
random values of the EUs’ capacities using 100 independent
simulation run.
In Fig. 1, the convergence of the utility achieved by each
EU from selling its energy is shown to reach the NSE. We
consider that 5 EUs are connected to the PG, and as shown
in the figure, the utility achieved by each EU reaches its NSE
after the 7th iteration. Importantly, the EU with a larger amount
of SE has a higher utility, which is due to the fact that it can
sell more energy to the PG, and hence, it is being paid more.
Consequently, its utility is larger.
Next, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
scheme by comparing its performance with a standard feed-in
4This can be done, for example, by using a single bit.
5Prj
X
(k) = argmin{‖ω − k‖, ω ∈ X}, ω ∈ Rn.
6For 5 EUs, the average price per unit energy is 35 cents/kWh [16].
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to reach a socially optimal NSE
Step-1
(i)- The PG announces EPG and Pr .
(ii)- EU i calculates pi = PrN , and plays a GNEP to determine VE energy xi, for
pi, using the S-S method [15].
S-S method:
a) At iteration l, EU i ∈ N computes the hyperplane projection r(xl
i
) and
updates xl+1
i
= r(xl
i
).
b) The EU checks: if r(xl
i
) = 0
if r(xl
i
) = 0
a) The EU chooses the energy xl to offer to the PG.
else
a) the EU i determines the hyperplane zl
i
and the half space Ml
i
from
the projection.
b) the EU updates the amount xl+1
i
from the projection of its previous
energy xl
i
on to X ∩Ml
i
and chooses to submit to the PG.
end if
(iii). The EU i determine µi = Ei − xi + pi and submits it to the PG.
(iv). The PG checks µi, ∀i ∈ N .
if µ1 = µ2 = ... = µN = µ
The PG determines the VE energy vector x of all the EUs in the network
in response to pi = p, ∀i ∈ N .
else
The PG directs the EUs to repeat (ii) and (iii).
end if
(v)- EUs submit their offered VE energies for pi ∀i ∈ N to the PG.
Step-2
(vi)- The PG optimizes (6) using a standard convex optimization technique [13], and
determines pi = p∗i ∀i ∈ N .
The optimized price vector p∗ is obtained.
(vii)- EU i receives the optimized price p∗
i
as offered by the PG.
(viii)- Each EU i again plays a GNEP for the offered price p∗
i
, following steps
(ii),(iii), and (iv) so as to determine the VE energy e∗
i
to supply to the PG in response
to p∗ .
The VE energy vector e∗ for p∗ is obtained.
The NPG reaches the NSE.
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Fig. 1: Convergence of the utility to NSE.
tariff scheme (FIT) [16]. We note that an FIT is an incentive
based energy trading scheme which is designed to increase
the use of renewable energy systems providing power to the
main grid when it is required. A higher tariff is paid to the
energy producers to encourage them to take part in energy
trading. For comparison, here we assume that the contract
between the EUs and the PG is such that the EUs are capable
of providing the PG with the required energy with a tariff of
60 cents per kWh [16]. In Fig. 2, we show the performance
comparison between the proposed and FIT schemes for the
average achieved utility per EU as the number of EUs varies
in the SG. As shown in this figure, an increase in the number
of EUs subsequently increases the freedom of the PG to buy its
energy from more EUs, and hence, the amount of energy sold
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Fig. 2: Effect of the network size on the average utility per EU.
5 10 15 20 25
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Number of EU in the SG
A
ve
ra
ge
 to
ta
l c
os
t t
o 
th
e 
PG
 
 
FIT scheme
Proposed NSG scheme
Fig. 3: Effect of the network size on the average total cost of the PG.
by each EU decreases. As a result, average utility decreases
for both the schemes. However, the proposed NSG, due to
its capability of choosing an optimal energy for maximizing
the EUs’ benefits, always shows a considerable improved
performance over the FIT scheme in terms of average utility
per EU. As seen in Fig. 2, the utility per EU for the proposed
NSG is 1.5 times, on average, better than the utility achieved
by an FIT scheme.
The effect of the number of EUs on the average total cost
to the PG is shown in Fig. 3 for both the NSG and the FIT
schemes for the same total price per unit of energy Pr. For a
fixed EPG, increasing the number of EUs from 5 to 15 allows
the PG to buy its energy from more EUs, and thus, enables
the PG to pay a cheaper rate. Consequently, the total cost
incurred by the PG decreases. However, to keep all the EUs
participating, the PG needs to pay the minimum mandatory
price pmin to each EU. Thus, as the number of EUs increases
from 20 to 25, the total cost to the PG increases due to the
mandatory payment to a large number of EUs. Fig. 3 shows
that the proposed scheme has significantly lower total cost to
the PG at small network sizes, e.g., for 10 EUs the average
total cost for the proposed scheme is half the total cost incurred
by the FIT scheme. However, as the network size increases,
the average total cost for the proposed NSG becomes closer
to the FIT scheme. In fact, as the network size increases, the
PG needs to optimize its price for a large number of EUs
while maintaining the minimum payment. Hence, due to the
constraint (2), a large number of EUs causes the PG to choose
a price close to its minimum payment and consequently, the
total cost for the proposed NSG becomes closer to that of the
FIT scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a demand-supply balance
technique by prioritizing consumer benefits, and have pro-
posed a Stackelberg game which leads to a socially optimal
Stackelberg equilibrium. We have shown that the proposed
scheme maximizes the utility of the end users at the solution
of the game, and at the same time keeps the total cost to the
power grid to a minimum. We have studied the properties of
the game analytically including the existence and the social
optimality of the studied scenario. The effectiveness of the
scheme has been demonstrated with considerable performance
improvement when compared to a standard feed-in tariff
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